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Purpose: 
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that to what extent the Iranian criminalisation of 
terrorism financing meets the international standards of counter-terrorism financing regime, 
in particular the Financing Convention and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)  
Recommendations,  and what is the main impediment for Iran to integrate at the international 
level to combat terrorism financing. Also, it tries to rate the Iranian criminalisation of 
terrorism financing in accordance with the FATF technical compliance rating.  
 
Design/Methodology/Approach: 
This subject is analysed from an Iranian perspective by undertaking fieldwork through 
collecting documents in Iran and using the official documents, statements, and laws, in 
particular the Iranian Law of Combating Financing of Terrorism (2018), both Persian and 
English sources. 
 
Findings:  
,UDQ¶V WHUURULVP ILQDQFLQJ offence is not completely in line with international counter-
terrorism financing regime because of an exemption for the struggle of individuals, nations, 
and national liberation movements with the aim of countering domination, foreign 
occupation, colonisation, and racism. The Iranian Supports for national liberation movements 
GHULYH IURP WKH &RQVWLWXWLRQDO /DZ WKDW UHTXLUHV ,UDQ¶V VXSSRUWV WKH VWUXJJOHV RI WKH
oppressed for their rights against the oppressors anywhere in the world. As a result, the FATF 
Recommendation 5 (criminalisation of terrorism financing) would be rated Partially 
Compliant. 
 
Originality/Value: 
No article exists specifically on this research field. To the best of the author knowledge, 
this paper, for the first time, examines the Iranian criminalisation of terrorism financing. 
It rates the criminalisation (Recommendation 5) based on the FATF technical 
compliance rating as no mutual evaluation has been conducted so far. The paper is useful 
for academicians, law enforcement, policymakers, legislators, and researchers.  
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Introduction 
 
Before the 9/11 attacks, counter-terrorism financing (CTF) regime was poorly enforced and 
only four countries,  Botswana, Sri Lanka, United Kingdom, and Uzbekistan had ratified the 
International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism (1999) µthe 
Financing Convention¶). This trend changed after the 9/11 attacks, mostly through the 
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interference of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373, a large 
number of states joined the Financing Convention (188), and the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) Recommendations (FATF, 2012). However, Iran is a particular case because it has 
been accused of the financial and military support for some non-state militant actors such as 
Hezbollah, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), all of which are internationally 
designated as terrorist groups (Levitt, 2007, 2006; Byman, 2008). Iran considered its 
implementation of the UNSCR 1373 as a national responsibility (UNSC, 2001b), but it has 
not ratified the Financing Convention although the government presented the Bill to Join the 
Financing Convention in 2017. Iran has been recognised as a high-risk and non-cooperative 
jurisdiction by the FATF. From 2009 to 2016, the FATF urged all jurisdictions to apply 
effective counter-measures with regard to Iran (FATF, 2009) GXHWRWKHGHILFLHQFLHVLQ,UDQ¶V
AML/CTF UHJLPH DQG WUDQVDFWLRQV DVVRFLDWHG WR ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU SUROLIHUDWLRQ FATF, 2010; 
UNSC, 2006, 2007, 2008)  and these counter-measures remained in place until 2016 
IROORZLQJ ,UDQ¶V KLJK SROLWLFDO FRPPLWPHQW RI WKH DJUHHG $FWLRQ 3ODQ WR DGGUHVV LWV
deficiencies and to seek technical assistant (FATF, 2018a). 
Although the Action Plan is secret, it is understood to require that Iran should amend the 
Anti-Money Laundering Law 2008 (AML), the Law of Combating Terrorism Financing 2016 
(LCTF); and should join the Financing Convention and the Palermo Convention if it wishes 
to be removed from the blacklist. One important reason that Iran cannot integrate at the 
international level to counter financing of terrorism and leading to consequent economic 
sanctions being imposed on Iran (Katzman, 2018; Happold and Eden, 2016), is its adoption 
of a different definition of terrorism, which exempts the National Liberation Movements 
(NLMs), on the part of other countries and the reflection of the adopted definition in its law 
and policy. The criminalisation of terrorism financing through the Financing Convention was 
proposed and developed by Western countries (Tofangsaz, 2018), which has contradictions, 
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under very different normative beliefs and structure, with the non-Western states, such as 
Iran. 
The CTF regime can be analysed according to three categories, including criminalisation of 
terrorism financing, financial regulations as preventive measures, and sanctions imposed on 
individuals and entities who support terrorist acts, terrorists and terrorist organisations (King 
et al, 2018; Gurule, 2009; Biersteker and Eckert, 2007). This paper only examines the 
criminalisation of terrorism financing in Iranian law in order to demonstrate to what extent 
the Iranian criminalisation of terrorism financing meets the international standards of CTF 
regime and what is the main impediment for Iran to integrate at the international level to 
combat terrorism financing. In addition to the compliance of the Iranian law with the 
international law, the issue of human rights and the rule of law regarding the criminalisation 
of terrorism financing is examined, to show the interaction between human rights and the rule 
of law; and the criminalisation of terrorism financing.  
Due to international pressures, Iran strikes some efforts to concentrate on counter-terrorism 
by the criminalisation of terrorism financing as a stand-alone offence. On the one hand, Iran 
has been accused of being a state-sponsor of terrorism (Clarke and Smyth, 2017; Wigginton 
et al, 2015; Byman, 2005). On the other hand, Iran has a common goal in combating some 
terrorist groups, such as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Al-Qaeda, and the Taliban 
(Esfandiary and Tabatabai, 2017; Malakoutikhah, 2018). Iran also is a victim of terrorist 
attacks from three dimensions. First, after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, various groups were 
militarily opposed to the Supreme Leader of the Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini. The 
leading opposition group was the Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK).1 The MEK survived the test of 
time and developed into the most disciplined armed organisation opposing the Islamic 
Republic (Abrahamian, 1989). Second, prominent domestic separatists, such as the Kurds, 
Baluch, and Arabs sought to acquire greater autonomy at the cost of potential fragmentation 
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of Iran. Finally, Iran is located in the geopolitical region of a seemingly continuous war zone 
which attracts terrorist groups, in particular around Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. Terrorist 
groups such as the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and ISIS are thus the primary foreign threats for 
security and stability in Iran (Malakoutikhah, 2018). 
TKLV DUWLFOH¶V XQLTXH FRQWULEXWLRQ WR WKH GHEDWH LV to explain and analyse from an Iranian 
perspective the attempt of Iran to criminalise terrorism financing and why it still encounters 
barriers. To this end, this article is divided into four sections. First, the Iranian legal and 
policy framework of terrorism financing is discussed in order to reveal the process of, and the 
requirement for, criminalisation of terrorism financing. The second section pertains to 
criminal elements of the offences of terrorism financing to illustrate to what extent mental 
and material elements of terrorism financing in Iranian law meet the international CTF. The 
third section elaborates on the main barrier to the international integration, which is the 
exemption of the NLMs, and its reflection in the Iranian laws and regulations. The fourth and 
final section is to assess Iranian criminalisation of terrorism financing based on the FATF 
technical compliance rating. As Iran has not sufficiently cooperated with the FATF, the 
normal mutual evaluation has not been carried out, so this section attempts to rate the Iranian 
criminalisation process. 
Iranian Legal and Policy Framework of Terrorism Financing  
 
The progress of legal andpolicy framework of CTF in Iran can be divided into three periods. 
The first deals with 2001 to 2008 when Iran relied on the existing laws to prevent terrorism 
and terrorism financing through the Islamic Penal Code (IPC). The second period considers 
2008 to 2016 during which time Iran made an effort to remedy the absence of CTF 
regulations through AML Law (2008). Third, from 2016 to the present day, Iran has enacted 
specific laws and regulations to combat terrorism financing, including the LCTF (2016), and 
the Amendment of the LCTF (2018). Each of the three periods is examined as follows. 
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In the first phase, the IPC forms the significant legal source for terrorism and terrorist-related 
activities in Iran. Since the IPC has been extracted from 6KDUL¶DK, the penal system has been 
affected by Islamic values and concepts (Qasemi, 2016). As a result, under the IPC, articles 
279 and 286, terrorists were charged with the criminal title moharebeh (Enmity against God) 
and fesad fel-arze (Spreading corruption on the earth), interchangeably.  
Moharebeh is defined DV µGUDZLQJ D ZHDSRQ RQ WKH OLIH SURSHUW\ RU KRQRU >UHIHUULQJ WR
IHPDOHPHPEHUVRIRQH¶VIDPLO\@RISHRSOHRUthreating them, in such manner that results in 
LQVHFXULW\ LQ WKHHQYLURQPHQW¶ (IPC, art 280). The punishment for moharebeh is one of the 
following penalties; the death penalty (hanging), crucifixion, amputation of right hand and 
left foot, or banishment (IPC, art 282). Choosing one of these punishments is under the 
jurisdiction of the judge.  Fesad fel-arze UHIHUV WR D SHUVRQ ZKR µZLGHO\ commits crimes 
against physical integrity and crimes against internal or external security of the country, 
criminal libel, a disorder in the state economic system, arson and annihilation, dissemination 
RIWR[LFPLFURELDODQGKD]DUGRXVPDWWHUV«WKDWFDXVHVHYHUHGLVRUGHULQWKHSXEOLFRUGHURI
the country, create insecurity or inflict substantial damage upon the physical integrity or 
SHUVRQVRUSXEOLFDQGSULYDWHSURSHUWLHV«¶ (IPC, art 286). The punishment for fesad fel-arze 
is solely the death penalty.  
There is no article in the IPC which refers to the offence of terrorism financing, so it may be 
considered as the aiding or abetting of an offence. Art 126 states three categories which are 
regarded as aider and abettor to an offence; every person who encourages, threatens, induces 
or provokes the other to commit an offence, or who causes preparation of offenses by 
conspiracy, deceit, or misuses of power; every person who makes or procures instruments of 
offence or provides means for committing the offence; and every person who facilitates 
preparation of an offence. In June 2017, five members of ISIS attacked the Iranian Parliament 
and the mausoleum of Ayatollah Khomeini, killing 17 people and wounding 42 (Spencer, 
6 
 
2017).Following the attacks, eight members of ISIS, who had a direct connection with the 
attackers, were arrested and convicted of the crime of abetting fesad-fel-arze. The main 
conviction was for being a member of ISIS, weapon smuggling and providing financial and 
military support for the attackers (Mashregh News, 2018). 
In the second phase, Iran criminalised money laundering offences in 2008 through the AML 
Law (2008) and an executive bylaw (2009).2 These regulations include the criminalisation of 
money laundering, the establishment of the Anti-Money Laundering High Council, the 
establishment of the Financial Intelligence Unit, the identification and verification of 
customers, and the Suspicious Transaction Reports. However, this 2008 Law was not 
regarded by the FATF as sufficient to prevent terrorism financing (FATF, 2018)  because of 
differences between money laundering and terrorism financing including the vector of 
criminality, the scale of operation, the variant response to identified risk, and the methods of 
illicit funding (King and Walker, 2015). Further, based on the technical compliance rating of 
the FATF, criminalisation of money laundering would be regarded as partially compliant 
with the FATF recommendations, such as with Saudi Arabia prior to its adoption of a stand-
alone statutory law of terrorism financing (FATF, 2018c). 
In the third phase, after 15 years of binding obligation on states imposed by the UNSCR 
 WR µ«SUHYHQW DQG VXSSUHVV WKH ILQDQFLQJ RI WHUURULVW DFWV¶ Iran recently enacted the 
LCTF (2016). The main feature of this Law is the criminalisation of terrorism financing as a 
stand-alone offence. The LCTF (2016) was regarded as insufficient by the FATF (FATF, 
2018a). The major inconsistency of the LCTF (2016) with the international law framework is 
the issue of criminalisation of terrorism financing, which exempts actions done by NLMs. 
Iran is not the only country which exempts NLMs from being subject to terrorism financing 
offences. Jordan, Namibia, Syria, Egypt, Yemen, and Kuwait also made a reservation to the 
Financing Convention for the exemption of the NLMs. Bahrain is another example which 
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considered an exemption for NLMs, and consequently was rated as partially compliant by the 
FATF (FATF, 2018d). Yet international pressures through imposing unfair sanctions have 
targeted only Iran due to political issues. Following ongoing criticism by the FATF, the 
LCTF (2016) was reformed in 2018 in order to be consistent with the FATF Action Plan. The 
details of, and similarities and differences between, the LCTF (2016) and the LCTF (2018), 
regarding the criminalisation, is discussed in the following sections. 
Mental Elements of the Offences of Terrorism Financing (Mens Rea) 
 
The cornerstone of criminal law is the principle of culpability which requires a guilty state of 
mind (Marchuk, 2014). The existence of the mental elements (mens rea) for the offences of 
terrorism financing can be justified on several grounds. If the aim of the criminal law is 
deterrence, it is necessary to punish people who deliberately break the law (Marchuk, 2014), 
not based on negligence or recklessness.  Based on the Financing Convention, the mens rea 
of the offence of terrorism financing has two aspects. The first is that the act of financing 
PXVWEHGRQHµwilfully¶ DVDFULPLQDO LQWHQWZKLFKPHDQV WKDW WKHFRQGXFW LVGHOLEHUDWHO\
committed, not accidentally or negligently. The second mental aspect of the mens rea of the 
offences of terrorism financing is whether the perpetrator must have had either the intention 
that the funds be used to finance terrorist acts, or the knowledge that the funds would be used 
for such purposes. The Financing Convention leaves the specification of intention and 
knowledge to each state party and does not mention what degree of intention and knowledge 
is needed.  
The LCTF (2018) removes the mental elements of the offences of TF from the previous 
LCTF (2016). The earlier Law UHIHUUHG WR WKH ZRUGV µLQWHQWLRQDOO\¶ DQG µNQRZLQJO\¶ WR
demonstrate the mental elements of the offences of terrorism financing, but the amendment 
version removes these two words. There is a presumption which might explain this omission. 
The legislator considered that the LCTF (2018) must be accompanied by the IPC, due to the 
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importance of the IPC in the Iranian criminal law system and the principle that all crimes 
happen deliberately and with intention and knowledge (Shahcheragh, 2012). 
In conclusion, in legislating against and criminalising terrorist financing, one crucial 
safeguard is the principle of legality, nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, which requires 
precision and clarity in laws and prohibits the ex post facto adoption of a law (Masferrer and 
Walker, 2013; UNODC, 2009). The certainty comprises two distinct factors: it guides people 
in complying with the law, and it imposes a limitation on governmental authority (Maxeiner, 
2008). Both the Financing Convention and the LCTF (2018) fall short in being certain and 
respect the rule of law regarding the mens rea of offences of terrorism financing. The main 
question here is whether a lower degree of culpability should give rise to criminal 
responsibility? In other words, to what extent is the full or limited mens rea important in the 
criminalisation of terrorism financing to be both legitimate and effective? The Financing 
Convention is not clear about whether full or limited mens rea is preferred; it refers to 
µZLOIXOO\¶ IRU WKHDFW LWVHOIZKLOH LWGRHVQRWGHWHUPLQH WKH UHTXLUHGGHJUHHIRU LQWHQWLRQRU
knowledge of outcomes. Regarding the Iranian law, the LCTF (2018) did not mention to the 
mens rea, while it is likely that the offence requires the mens rea. 
Material Elements of the Offences of Terrorism Financing (Actus Reus) 
  
Financing 
 
The material elements (actus reus) of the offences of terrorism financing are, first, 
µILQDQFLQJ¶ DQG VHFRQG µWHUURULVW DFWV¶ or µQRQ-DWWDFNV SXUSRVHV¶ LQ ERWK LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ
and Iranian law. The financing element is defined as providing or collecting funds or other 
assets. Regarding the Iranian law, one of the objections raised by the FATF over the LCTF 
(2016) was in association with the financing element (Mahjourian, 2018). The LCTF (2018) 
has been reformed DQGLQVWHDGRIµSURYLGLQJand collecting funds¶ LWUHIHUVWRµSURYLGLQJor 
collecting funds¶ The word of and/or can change the limitation and broadness of the offences 
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of terrorism financing%\FKDQJLQJWKHZRUGµDQG¶WRµRU¶ the material element, financing, 
only one aspect, providing or collecting funds, is enough to meet the requirement for the 
offences of terrorism financing. 
The LCTF (2016-2018) refers to funds, assets and financial sources. The executive bylaw of 
the LCTF (2016-2018) explains funds, article 1(d), and assets, article 1(e), in details and 
GLIIHUHQWLDWHV EHWZHHQ IXQGV DQG DVVHWV µ)XQGV¶ LQFOXGH DQ\ kind of coins, notes, cheques 
{example of different type of cheques}, anonymous payment cards, either in Rial or foreign 
FXUUHQF\µ$VVHW¶FDQPHDQWDQJLEOHRULQWDQJLEOHPRYDEOHRULPPRYDEOHKRZHYHUDFTXLUHG 
or assets of official or ordinary documents in electronic or digital format.  The LCTF (2016-
GLGQRWH[SODLQDERXWµILQDQFLDOVRXUFHV¶EXWJLYHVVRPHH[DPSOHVDVWKHSURFHHGVRI
currency smuggling, donations, money transfer, buying and selling financial and credit 
instruments, opening an account directly or indirectly, and credit financing.  
It seems that the LCTF (2016-2018) tends to criminalise the broad range of financing, as a 
material element of the offences of terrorism financing. The LCTF (2016-2018) in respect to 
broadness is close to the UNSCR 1373, ZKLFKUHIHUVWRµIXQGVILQDQFLDODVVHWVRUHFRQRPLF
resources or financial or other related services¶ rather than the Financing Convention. When 
it refers to any economic activity, it means production, distribution, exchange and 
consumption of goods and services. The broadness in forms of funds is not without 
challenges, in particular regarding services. Providing services for terrorists or terrorist 
organisations, such as transportation, insurance, defence and administration of justice, 
medicine, and consumer service, might be regarded as terrorism financing and even might 
undermine the legitimacy of humanitarian aid.  
However, here some of these mentioned services affect human rights; as an example, can 
providing medicine or defence and administrative justice be regarded as terrorism financing? 
In accordance with the provided definition of the UNSCR 1373, all services which sustain the 
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capability of the terrorists or terrorist organisations, even without any link to attacks, are 
criminalised. While, providing medical services to terrorists, on the one hand, can be 
considered as terrorism financing, on the other hand if the medicine is not provided, it might 
be considered as a violation of human rights, in particular, the right to life, the right to health, 
the right to protection from inhuman and degrading treatment. Further, there is a 
contradiction between international humanitarian law (IHL) and CTF; under IHL, medical 
professionals cannot be prosecuted for fulfilling their medical duties, regardless of who is 
benefiting from them (Additional Protocol, 1977, art 16), including terrorists, but under CTF, 
there is a prohibition against providing all services to terrorists or terrorist organisations. The 
contradiction presents difficulties regarding both the lack of certainty that the consequences 
of acts are not predictable and in reference to violating human rights for not providing 
medical assistance to terrorists, if it is accepted under IHL. The point can be further 
illustrated in relation to Iran. Although Iran is alleged to be financing terrorist organisations, 
in terms of the re-imposition of the US sanctions by the withdrawal from the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) required 
that the US must remove any impediments arising from the re-imposition of sanctions 
affecting the free exportation to Iran of medicines and medical devices; foodstuffs and 
agricultural commodities, and parts, equipment and associated services necessary for the 
safety of civil aviation (ICJ, 2018). However, the language of the UNSCR, the Financing 
Convention and the LCTF (2018) is too general and can cover all services at the expense of 
violation of human rights. It would be preferable if anti-terrorism law were to be confined to 
those funds which do not have any links with human rights. 
Terrorist Attacks or Non-Attack Purposes 
 
The second material element of the offences of terrorism financing is related to terrorist acts 
and non-attack purposes. The terrorist attacks, according to the Financing Convention, are 
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derived from two sources: treaty offences DQG D µFatch-DOO¶ SURYLVLRQ (FATF, 2016). The 
treaty offences cover 30 terrorist acts set out through nine treaties which state that the 
provision or collection of funds to commit these acts are criminalised as the offence of 
terrorism financing.  However, not all states have ratified these nine treaties; one example is 
Iran. The LCTF (2016-2018) also mentions the terrorist acts covered by the treaty offences if 
Iran joins the treaties.  
The catch-all special supplemental definition in the Financing Convention refers to two 
IDFWRUV ILUVW µDQ\RWKHUDcts intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian¶; 
DQG VHFRQG ZKHUH WKH SXUSRVH RI WKH DFWV LV µWR LQWLPLGDWH D SRSXODWLRQ RU WR FRPSHO D
government or an international organisation WR GR RU WR DEVWDLQ IURP GRLQJ DQ\ DFW¶ This 
definition is not comprehensive and it is vague because it is not apparent what types of 
conduct, under what circumstances and against whom are criminalised (Tofangsaz, 2018). 
The Iranian criminal law has not defined terrorism or terrorist acts to date, while the LCTF 
(2016-2018), for the first time defines a terrorist act. This exact situation is similar to the 
international community in which no definition of terrorism has been agreed unless through 
the Financing Convention. The catch-all definition of terrorist acts in the LCTF (2018) refers 
to two factors. 
7KH ILUVW LV µDQ\ YLROHQW DFW FDXVH VHULRXV LQMXU\«DJDLQVW D SRSXODWLRQ¶ 7KLV GHILQLWLRQ LV
similar to the Financing Convention with some differences. Unlike the Financing 
&RQYHQWLRQLWRQO\UHIHUVWRµYLROHQWDFW¶UDWKHUWKDQµDQ\RWKHUDFW¶ZKLFKFRQILQHVWKHDFWV
to being violent. Also in terms of causing serious and bodily injury in which the term 
µserious¶ is not precise, the LCTF (2018) determines what it means by seriousness which 
depends on the diyyah (blood money) extracted from the 6KDUL¶DK (Kar, 2005). The 
considerable issue here is that the LCTF (2016) only criminalised the act of terrorism against 
µSHUVRQVZLWKOHJDOLPPXQLW\¶not the general population. However this issue has now been 
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amended and consequently the LCTF (2018) criminalises the terrorist activities against the 
population. 
7KHVHFRQGIDFWRULVµWRLQIOXHQFHWKHSROLFLHVGHFLVLRQVDQGPHDVXUHVRI,UDQRWKHUFRXQWULHV 
and international RUJDQLVDWLRQV¶ One of the main issues which distinguishes terrorism from 
other crimes is that the intent of acts of terrorism is to terrorise and intimidate the population 
(Schmid, 2011), while the current definition does not mention this issue. It seems that this 
definition has been inspired by the amount and target of terrorist attacks which happened 
inside of Iran. Most of the attacks carried out against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
(IRGC) PHPEHUV ZHUH QHDU WR ERUGHUV RIILFLDOV DQG RIILFLDOV¶ GHSDUWPHQWV UDWKHU WKDQ
civilians in shopping centres or streets (Goulka et al, 2009). As a result of these targets, and 
the importance of high security for Iran from dissident nationalists, separatists and foreign 
terrorists, the focus of the definition is on the state rather than the intimidation of civilians.  
In addition to terrorist attacks, providing or collecting funds for non-attack purposes is 
regarded as material element of the offences of terrorism financing (UNSC, 2015; Keatinge, 
2015; Sageman, 2008). Terrorist organisations need funds for five broad categories of 
activities, including operation, propaganda and recruitment, training, salaries and member 
compensation, and social services (FATF, 2015).  Both the Financing Convention (art 2(3)) 
and the LCTF (2018) (art 1) criminalise financing terrorist and terrorist organisations for the 
purpose of non-attacks activities. The LCTF (2016) only criminalised the financing of 
terrorist acts, the amendment version criminalised the financing of non-attack purposes. 
In conclusion, the criminalisation of terrorism financing in the Iranian law covers the 
expectation of the counter-terrorism financing regime although the international and domestic 
CTF regime are not comprehensive and sometimes both are against the rule of law and 
human rights by being very broad or being uncertain. However, if Iran had maintained this 
definition without any exemptions, some non-state militant actors would have fallen down in 
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the category of catch-all definition of terrorism, so that, supporting and financing them would 
be regarded as offences of terrorism financing. To prevent this issue, Iran exempts the NLMs 
from being the subject of the LCTF (2016-2018) subsequently this exemption causing an 
obstacle for Iran in order not to integrate at the international level to counter terrorism 
financing. Next section addresses the exemption of NLMs in detail. 
Exemption for National Liberation Movements 
 
One of the critical problems in the criminalisation of terrorism and terrorism financing is the 
distinction between terrorist organisations and NLMs; articulating this distinction remains a 
significant concern for the international community (Carlile, 2007). The lack of agreement on 
the definition of terrorism which separates terrorists from NLMs undermines the legitimacy 
of the criminalisation of terrorism financing. Because of the uncertainty, one might argue that 
financing a specific group is legitimate because it is a NLM; this argument has been adopted 
by Iran in response to some non-state militant actors, such as the Hezbollah and Hamas.  
This problem goes back to the complex interaction between anti-terrorism law and IHL 
because no general international law determines whether anti-terrorism law or IHL is lex 
specialis derogat legi generali (the more special law) (Saul, 2016; Lindroos, 2005); the main 
difficulty is that NLMs should be governed by anti-terrorism law or IHL, because under IHL, 
terrorism is prohibited both in international and non-international armed conflict as well 
(Geneva Convention, 1949, art 33). Unlike the Western countries, the Organisation of Islamic 
&RRSHUDWLRQ¶V FRXQWULHV 2,& EHOLHYH WKDW WKH DFWLYLWLHV RI WKH 1/0V PXVW be governed 
XQGHU,+/7KH2,&¶VSURSRVDOWRWKH81'UDIW&RPSUHKHQVLYH7HUURULVP&RQYHQWLRQVWDWHV
WKDWµWKHDFWLYLWLHVRf the parties during an armed conflict, including in situations of foreign 
occupation, as those terms are understood under international humanitarian law, which is 
JRYHUQHGE\WKDWODZDUHQRWJRYHUQHGE\WKLV&RQYHQWLRQ¶ (UNGA, 1996).  
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However, this problem is not limited to the non-Western countries. It also is a challenging 
issue in the UK. Although there is not any exemption for NLMs in the UK Terrorism Act 
(2000), because there is an inconsistency in regard to the existence and scope of exclusionary 
provisions in international and national law (R v. Gul, 2013). In the case of T v. SSHD, the 
6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWHUHIXVHG7¶VDSSOLFDWLRQIRUSROLWLFDODV\OXPEHFDXVHRIKLVLQYROYHPHQWLQ
airport bombings which were carried out on behalf of a political organisation to overthrow 
WKH$OJHULDQJRYHUQPHQW7KH-XGLFLDO&RPPLWWHHFRQFOXGHGWKDWµit would be inappropriate 
to characterise indiscriminate bombings which led to the deaths of innocent people as 
political crimes¶. In the case of R v. Gul, the appellant defended his uploaded videos in which 
members of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban attacked the military targets of the coalition forces in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. His principal defence was that the targeted attack is justified as self-
defence, resisting the invasion of their country. The court concluded that because of no 
agreement on whether attacks by freedom fighters can be exempted from the terrorism label 
and no agreed definition of terrorism in international law, the mentioned attack can be 
regarded as terrorism in domestic law. So that, under domestic law of some countries, such as 
the UK, certain acts might be regarded as terrorism even if it is considered lawful under IHL. 
Thus, lack of agreed definition of terrorism at the international level reflects on a broad or 
narrow definition in domestic law of countries.  
At the international level, the Financing Convention and also the FATF Recommendations 
both reject any exemption of NLMs. The Financing Convention, art 6 declares that 
µ«FULPLQDODFWVDUHXQGHUQRFLUFXPVWDQFHVjustifiable«¶. This article demonstrates that the 
definition of terrorism must cover even the NLMs if they carry out criminal acts, such as 
terrorist activities. Although the exemptions for the NLMs were rejected in the Financing 
Convention, in the travaux preparatoires, some countries3 sought to differentiate between the 
struggle of peoples for independence and self-determination and acts of violence for 
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REMHFWLYHVZKLFKKDGQRWKLQJWRGRZLWKWKHLGHDOVRIWKHSHRSOH¶VVWUXJJOHVVLQFHWKLVULJKWLV 
legitimate under the UN Charter. They believed that the draft of the Financing Convention is 
weak and left the door open for impunity and abuse (UNGA, 1999a, 1999b, 2000a, 2000b).  
The exemption of NLMs from being the subject of terrorism or terrorism-related offences, 
such as financing, is considered by some countries in their national law, such as Bahrain 
(FATF, 2018d). As for Iran, Art 154 of the Iranian Constitution GHFODUHVWKDWµ«LWVXSSRUWV
WKHVWUXJJOHVRIWKHRSSUHVVHGIRUWKHLUULJKWVDJDLQVWWKHRSSUHVVRUVDQ\ZKHUHLQWKHZRUOG¶
and turns this into one of the main pillars of Iranian foreign policy, which insists on 
maintaining it by supporting NLMs both financially and militarily. For instance, the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict remains unsolved which Iran supports the right of the Palestinian people 
to self-determination, in pursuit RIDQHQGWRWKH,VUDHOL¶VLOOHJDORFFXSDWLRQ,UDQLDQRfficials 
believe that peace in the Middle East cannot be achieved unless through solving the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict (Mamdouhi, 2018). Further, the UN also fails to solve the conflict 
although Israel was condemned by the UN for violating human rights of the Palestinian 
people, in particular the right to self-determination (ICJ, 2004). 
However, according to the LCTF (2016), art 1, actions done by people to encounter some 
affairs such as occupation are not subjected to terrorist actions. This article was criticised by 
the FATF, and it requested the legislature to adequately criminalise terrorism financing by 
removing the exemption (FATF, 2018a). The amendment version of 2018 focuses on the 
introducing of the terrorist group (Mahjourian, 2018), and states that:  
«GHWHUPLQDWLRQ RI FULWHULD IRU activities, individuals, terrorist organisations and groups 
subjected to this law, by considering art 154 of the Constitution, and by emphasising the right 
of individuals, nations, NLMs with the aim of countering domination, foreign occupation, 
colonisation, and racism, is the duty of the supreme national security (SNS). 
 
In practice, this amendment will probably not satisfy the FATF because only the word order 
has been changed, which does not lead the NMLs to be subject to this Law. Due to the 
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importance of the Constitution, the Parliament members emphasised this article during the 
debates on the amended version of the LCTF (2018).4 
Furthermore, the government presented the Bill to Join the Financing Convention in 2017. 
The important aspect of the Bill is two declarations made by which, first, the legitimate 
struggle of people against colonial domination and foreign occupation for the right of self-
determination, which is recognised under international law, does not include terrorist acts 
under article 2 (1) (b) of the Financing Convention. Second, the provisions of the Financing 
Convention that are in conflict with the Constitution are not binding on the government. 
Although the Bill to Join the Financing Convention has not been accepted by the Parliament, 
these two declarations are very crucial for both Iran and some other member parties to the 
Financing Convention.  
By looking at the reservations/declarations made by countries to the Financing Convention, 
all have a declaration/reservation similar WR ,UDQ¶V GHFODUDWLRQ UHJDUGLQJ WKH H[HPSWLRQ IRU
NLMs. These declarations/reservations were opposed by some member parties, such as 
Belgium and the United Kingdom, because the declarations/reservations limit the scope of 
the Convention on a unilateral basis and in a way, which is contrary to its object and purpose 
(UNTC). If Iran joined the Financing Convention with a reservation on the exemption for 
NLMs, it would also be opposed by other countries. The exemption undermines the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of the criminalisation of terrorism financing offences. If the 
NLMs carried out terrorist attacks, no matter the justification, they should not be exempted 
from punishment under the terrorism financing.  
Conclusion: FATF Technical Compliance Rating on Recommendation 5 
 
Iran has not cooperated with the FATF to publish mutual evaluation. Based on this research, 
,UDQ¶VWHFKQLFDOFRPSOLDQFHwith Recommendation 5 (criminalisation of terrorism financing) 
is assessed. The rating below is based on the LCTF (2018) as a final version of the Law. The 
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United Kingdom (FATF, 2018b), Bahrain (FATF, 2018d), Saudi Arabia (FATF, 2018c) and 
Kuwait (FATF, 2011) technical compliance ratings are considered WR DVVHVV ,UDQ¶V
compliance rating.  
Criterion 5.1: ,UDQ¶Vterrorism financing offence states that providing or collecting funds or 
assets, by any means, whether from a legitimate or illegitimate source and or using financial 
resources derived from [some examples are mentioned here: author] in full or in part, for 
carrying out any economic activity by oneself or another to carry out the following activities 
or to provide them to terrorist individuals or terrorist organisations is considered financing of 
terrorism. (LCTF, art 1) 
However, Iran exempts the NLMs as subjects of this Law (LCTF, art 1(4)). Through the 
inclusion of this exemption, the terrorism financing offence is narrow in scope and 
inconsistent with the Financing Convention. 
Criterion 5.2: ,UDQ¶V terrorism financing offence does not refer to the mens rea of the 
offence. It is highly likely that the legislator considered the principle of culpability for all 
crimes and the accompanying the LCTF with IPC. (IPC, arts 144 and 145) However, the 
LCTF did not mention that the IPC may or may not be applied to the terrorism financing 
offence. 
Criterion 5.3: The LCTF refers to funds, assets and financial sources whether from a 
legitimate or illegitimate source which cover all range of activities. (LCTF Executive bylaw, 
art 1(e) & (d)). 
Criterion 5.4: The Iranian definition of terrorist acts is broad which covers any violent act 
causing serious bodily injury to influence the policies, decisions and measures of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, other countries and or international organisations. However, the exemption 
for NLMs in LCTF, art 1(4) potentially limits the scope of the terrorist acts. 
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Criterion 5.5: The Iranian terrorism financing criminalisation covers the funds without any 
link to specific terrorist acts; if the funds provided for terrorist or terrorist organisations are 
regarded as terrorism financing offence. (LCTF, art 1) 
Criterion 5.6: The penalties available for terrorism financing are not proportionate and 
dissuasive. If the terrorism financing is regarded as moharebe or fesad-fel-arze, a financier 
charged with the penalties of the mentioned crimes. For moharebeh, the punishment is one of 
the four: the death penalty (hanging), crucifixion, amputation of right hand and left foot, or 
banishment. The punishment for fesad fel-arze is solely the death penalty. (IPC, arts 282 & 
287). Otherwise the criminals will be sentenced to 2 to 5 years in prison and cash penalty 
equivalent of 2 or 5 fold of financed funds. (LCTF, art 2) 
Criterion 5.7: In addition to the natural person, the Iranian law includes criminal liability for 
legal person. (LCTF, art 4) for more information it refers to the IPC which states that the 
legal person may incur criminal liability where a legal representative of the legal person 
commits an offence in the name or for the benefit of the legal person. (IPC, art 143) 
Criterion 5.8: The LCTF addresses the heading, organising, directing and attempting to 
commit terrorism financing and for punishment of the mentioned ancillary offences refer to 
the IPC. However, other ancillary offences such as complicity in an offence (IPC, art 125) 
and aiding and abetting in an offence (IPC, arts 126 to129) did not mention in the LCTF and 
also it is unclear that the IPC should be applied or not.  
Criterion 5.9: Terrorism financing offences are designated as money laundering predicate 
offences as Iran adopts an all-crime approach to the offences underpinning money-
laundering. (AML, art 2 & 3 and LCTF, art 15) 
Criterion 5.10: The ,UDQ¶VWHUURULVPILQDQFLQJRIIHQFHVDSSO\regardless of the place where 
the crime committed, the nationality and the residency of an offender. (LCTF, art 1(4)) 
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,UDQ¶Vterrorism financing offence is not in line with the Financing Convention. Specially, due 
to two reasons, first an exemption for WKHVWUXJJOHRI µLQGLYLGXDOVQDWLRQV1/0VZLWK WKH
aim of countering domination, foreign occupation, colonisation, and racism¶ and the second 
is that whether and to what extent the IPC may be applied to the terrorism financing offence. 
Thus, Recommendation 5 would be rated Partially Compliant. It must be said that the 
international pressures on Iran for exemption NLMs from being regarded as terrorists are not 
fair because this issue is not limited to Iran, other countries also exempt NLMs from the 
criminalisation of terrorism or terrorism-related offences. But, due to political issues, the 
international sanctions have imposed only on Iran because of supporting NLMs. Supporting 
NLMs by Iran stems from the Constitutional Law which has a primacy; the Constitution is a 
declaration of the social, cultural, political, and economic foundations of the Iranian society 
based on Islamic principles and norms. So that, ,UDQ¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\LVWRVXSSRUWWKHVWUXJJOH
of the oppressed, such as the Palestinians for their self-determination right as confirmed 
through the UN Resolutions (UNGA, 1974). In a broad context, the UN falls short in 
undertaking its responsibility to maintain international peace, to achieve international 
cooperation in solving international problems, and to develop friendly relations among 
nations (UN Charter, 1945). One is related to the failure of the UN to reach an agreed 
definition of terrorism and the other is in association with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
which remains unsolved since the question was brought to the General Assembly for the first 
time in 1947 (UNSC, 1967, 1973). 
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 In 2012, the MEK was delisted from the US terrorist list due to the confirmed absence of 
WHUURULVW DFWLYLWLHV E\ WKH JURXS 86 'HSDUWPHQW RI 6WDWH µ'HOLVWLQJ RI WKH 0XMDKHGLQ-e 
.KDOT¶ 'HSDUWPHQW RI 6WDWH 6HSWHPEHU  
www.state.gov/j/ct/ris/other/des/266607.htm accessed 9 July 2017%ULWDLQ¶V&RXUWRI$SSHDO
ordered the government to revoke the terrorist designation, because from 2001 no military 
activity had been carried out by the MEK. (%ULWDLQ¶V &RXUW RI $SSHDO 2UGHUV 3HRSOH¶V
Mojahedin Organization of Iran Removed from Terror List, 7 May 2008). Home Office, 
Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2008, NO. 1645. In 
2009, the EU revoked the MEK from the terror list because of the lack of two conditions for 
EHLQJDWHUURULVWJURXSLQFOXGLQJµVHULRXVDQGUHOLDEOHHYLGHQFHRUFOXH¶ Article 1(4) of the 
Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, and µFRPPLWWLQJRUDWWHPSWLQJWRFRPPLWSUDFWLcing in 
RU IDFLOLWDWLQJ WKH FRPPLVVLRQ RI DQ\ DFW RI WHUURULVP¶ Article 2(3) of the Regulation 
2580/2001. 
2
 These executive-bylaws are authorised by the Council of Ministers to frame procedures for 
the implementation of the laws. The ratification and the regulations of the government and 
the decisions of the commissions mentioned under this Article shall also be brought to the 
notice of the Speaker of the Parliament while being communicated for implementation so that 
in the event he finds them contrary to law, he may send the same stating the reason for 
reconsideration by the Council of Ministers.  
3
 Oman, Qatar, Cuba, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Syria, Bahrain, Libya, and Pakistan. 
4
 Source: fieldwork conducted in Tehran, Iran in June/July 2018. 
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